We study the welfare-theoretic consequences of diverging social and private time-preference rates and time-to-build for the transition to a low-carbon energy industry. We show that time-to-build, a prevalent characteristic of capital accumulation in the energy sector, amplifies the distortion induced by the split discount rates. Thus, these two characteristics create in a mutually reinforcing way less favorable circumstances for the introduction of new clean energy technologies as compared to the social optimum, even if welfare losses from emissions are internalized. We discuss resulting policy implications with particular emphasis on the energy sector.
Introduction
How to accomplish the transition to a low-carbon energy industry in a socially optimal way is the subject of an ongoing debate. For instance, while the EU promotes emission reduction via environmental regulations that cap emissions (e.g. European Commission 2005), the US concentrate on technology policy to foster energy efficiency and progress in clean technologies (e.g. US Government 2002) .
1 Typically, investments in the energy sector concern long-lived and cost-intensive capital goods, which are also associated with particularly long construction times. At the same time, due to their environmental impact, they have long-term consequences for the society as a whole. Another distinctive feature of the energy sector is its recent liberalization in most industrialized countries. Investment decisions are now mainly governed by private actors. As a consequence, not only environmental preferences, but also time preferences, both on social and on private levels, are likely to play a key role in the transition to a low-emission energy industry.
In this paper, we investigate such a transition in a stylized general equilibrium framework, which incorporates the distinctive features of the energy sector as outlined above. Therefore, we consider two energy technologies, which exhibit different characteristics. The established technology gives rise to an environmentally harmful pollutant, which can partly be disarmed by abatement effort. The new technology is clean, but its specific capital needs a positive time span to be built. That is, there is a time lag between the cost of investment and the new capital becoming productive. We assume that in the status quo the established production technique is fully developed, while the new technology is only to be produced and thus may eventually replace the established one. In addition, we account for the recent liberalization of energy markets by assuming that investments in capital are governed by private actors who exhibit a private time preference rate which exceeds the social rate. We show that these two characteristics, the time-to-build feature and the split in time preference rates, create, in a mutually reinforcing way, less favorable circumstances for the introduction of the new and the replacement of the old energy technology compared to the social optimum, even if the welfare losses from emissions are fully internalized. We show how the social optimum can be achieved in a decentralized market economy by a combination of environmental and technology policies.
As an outcome of the discounting debate, it is well recognized in economics and finance that, in general, social and private time-preference rates differ for several reasons (e.g. Frederick et al. 2002 , Groom et al. 2005 , Lind et al. 1982 , Mehra and Prescott 2003 , Portney and Weyant 1999 . Traditional categories include distortionary taxation, distortionary public policies, imperfect competition and production externalities, the regulation of which is generally clear, at least in theory. More recent contributions have been providing further causes for which there is no established optimal policy treatment, and which are particularly relevant in environments where private investors rely upon private financial markets to finance investments in new technologies. Grant and Quiggin (2003) show that the incapacity to fully pool idiosyncratic risk due to adverse-selection problems may lead to an enhanced equity premium. Gollier (2002) studies the socially optimal discount rate for public projects the time horizons of which extend far beyond the longest maturity of available securities. He finds that uncertainty may decrease the optimal social discount rate. In view of the ongoing discussion with respect to the causes of split time preferences, we omit an endogenous explanation of the time-preference distortion. For analytical tractability, we stick to the most simple case of a world where outcomes are certain and preferences are separable in time and in consumption of a final good and emissions. This allows us to analyze the welfare implications of split timepreference rates for time-lagged technological transitions in general and to treat policy implications of those cases, where the market failure underlying the distortion cannot otherwise be remedied. Our paper complements the wide-spanned literature on induced technological change and the environment. In this literature, the intertemporal nature of the climate change problem is mostly addressed either in endogenous growth or integrated assessment models. Top-down approaches study induced technological change by applying one representative aggregated production technology, which becomes more efficient and/or less polluting by technological change (e.g. Bovenberg and Smulders 1995 , Goulder and Mathai 2000 , Müller-Fürstenberger and Stephan forthcoming, Nordhaus 2002 , Newell et al. 1999 , Tahvonen and Salo 2001 . In bottom-up approaches, induced technological change also allows for structural change between competing technologies (e.g. Gerlagh and Van der Zwaan 2003 , Goulder and Schneider 1999 , Van der Zwaan et al. 2002 . They have in common that they model technological change endogenously as a gradual improvement resulting either from R&D investments or learning by doing. They focus on positive spillovers to other firms from the innovation process or dynamic increasing returns stemming from learning by using, learning by doing or network externalities typically related to the diffusion of new technologies as sources of market failure induc-ing technology policy (Jaffe et al. 2005) . In contrast to this literature, we abstract from these components of long-run technological change in particular, and growth in general. Instead we emphasize the welfare-theoretic consequences of the split of social and private time preference rates and the time-to-build feature in a framework of structural change. As in Winkler (forthcoming), we rather adopt a medium-term perspective, in which the set of available technologies is given, and the system dynamics is governed by the accumulation of the corresponding specific capital stocks.
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Although derived from a stylized theoretical model, our results have direct policy implications for the energy sector in particular, and technological transitions in general. With respect to the former, we expect the energy sector, due to its long constructions times and the implied reinforcing effect, to be particularly vulnerable for inefficiencies caused by split time-preference rates. In addition, our results give new theoretical support for subsidizing new less polluting energy technologies. From a more general perspective, we provide a new reason why environmental regulation should be complemented by technology policy.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in section 2. In sections 3 and 4, we solve the intertemporal optimization problems the in social optimum and in the decentralized competitive market economy, and derive conditions for partial and full replacement of the established by the new energy technology. In section 5, we discuss model assumptions and policy implications. Section 6 concludes.
The model
Consider an economy composed of two vertically integrated sectors, the energy sector and the investment sector. Labor constitutes the only primary input. It is by assumption fixed to unity at all times t. The energy sector comprises two technologies, an established and a new one. The established technology is fully set up at the beginning of the planning horizon. As a consequence, we do not explicitly consider capital for the established technology. We include the costs of employing and maintaining the capital stock into the labor costs which are normalized to 1. The established technology generates one unit of energy x for every unit of labor l 1 employed. In addition, each unit of output produced gives rise to one unit of an unwanted and harmful joint output j:
Abatement effort a per unit of energy (partially) reduces the joint output. The function G denotes the fraction of the joint output j which is disarmed by abatement. G is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, satisfying G(0) = 0, G > 0, G < 0 and lim a→∞ G(a) = 1. We impose Inada conditions lim a→0 G (a) = ∞, lim a→∞ G (a) = 0 to ensure that the abatement effort a is strictly positive and finite along the optimal path as long as l 1 > 1. Then, net emissions e equal the amount of joint output j minus abatement:
The new technology employs λ units of labor together with one unit of the specific capital good k to produce one unit of energy:
Without loss of generality, the new technology does not produce an unwanted joint output. Energy is assumed to be homogeneous, such that total production x equals:
The investment sector employs one unit of labor to produce one unit of the capital good. We assume that the creation of new capital goods needs a positive time span σ. That is, there is a time lag σ between the costs of investment i and the emergence of productive capital k. The intuition behind this assumption is twofold. On the one hand, power plants are not built in a day but need substantial time for creation. 3 On the other hand, the time lag σ can also be identified with the time required for the R&D of a new technology. In addition, the capital stock k deteriorates at the constant and exogenously given rate γ, implying the following equation of motion:
Due to the time lag σ the equation of motion for the capital stock (5) constitutes a retarded differential-difference equation. Thus, variations of the capital stock k do not only depend on parameters evaluated at time t but also on parameters evaluated at the earlier time t − σ. To close the model we consider a representative consumer who derives instantaneous utility from consumption of the final product and disutility from net emissions.
4 Like Arrow and Kurz (1970: 116) we assume that the representative consumer's private rate of time preference differs from the social. That is, the representative consumer applies different intertemporal weights between welfare today and welfare tomorrow compared to a social planner maximizing social welfare. For simplicity, we consider instantaneous welfare to be additively separable in energy consumption x and net emissions e. As a consequence, the representative consumer (privately) maximizes
whereas, at the same time, the social planner maximizes
where U and D are twice differentiable functions with U > 0, U < 0, and lim x→0 U = ∞ and D (0) ≥ 0, D > 0 for any positive amount of emissions e, and D > 0. We concentrate on the empirically relevant case that the private rate of time preference ρ p exceeds the socially efficient rate ρ, i.e. ρ p > ρ. That is, individual actors are in a private decision context more impatient to consume than society as a whole. As discussed in section 1, in view of the ongoing debate with respect to causes and policy treatments we omit, however, an endogenous explanation of the split of time preference rates and rather focus on the implications of this assumption.
Social optimum
We now derive the optimal plan for the development of the model economy. As outlined in section 2, social welfare is given by equation (7). Thus, the social planner solves the following maximization problem:
subject to
For the dynamics of the economy it is important that, due to the linearity of the production techniques, two corner solutions can occur along the optimal path. It can either be optimal to only use the established technology at all times, which corresponds to i(t) = 0 ∀ t. Or, if investment in the new technology is optimal (i.e. i(t) > 0 ∀ t), the new technology may eventually fully replace the established one and thus l 1 (t) = 0 ∀t ≥ t . As a consequence, we have to check these two corner solutions, in addition to the inner solution, to characterize the complete dynamics of the model economy.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the social optimum
To solve the optimization problem (8), we apply the generalized maximum principle derived in El-Hodiri et al. (1972) for time-lagged optimal control problems. One obtains the following present-value Hamiltonian H:
Total energy x(t) is derived by assuming efficient labor allocation among the three production processes in the two sectors, i.e. 1 = (1 + a(t))l 1 (t) + l 2 (t) + i(t) ∀t, and full employment of the capital stock. In this case, equation (3) yields x 2 (t) =
where q k denotes the costate variable or shadow price of the capital stock k, and q x , q e , q i and q l 1 denote the Kuhn-Tucker parameters for the (in)equality conditions (8b), (8c) and (8e). Assuming the Hamiltonian H to be continuously differentiable with respect to the control variables a and i, the following necessary conditions hold for an optimal solution:
As the Hamiltonian is strictly concave (at least along the optimal path), the optimal solution is unique and the necessary conditions (10a)-(10g) are also sufficient if, in addition, the following transversality condition holds:
Conditions (10a) and (10b) state that along the optimal path the shadow price of energy equals the marginal utility of energy and the shadow price of net emissions equals the marginal disutility of net emissions. From condition (10g) we know that q l 1 l 1 = 0 ∀ t. Hence, the last term in condition (10c) equals 0 and, as long as l 1 > 0, we achieve by inserting conditions (10a) and (10b):
This condition expresses that along the optimal path (and as long as l 1 > 0) the utility of an additional marginal unit of energy equals the disutility of the emissions that it induces. Along the optimal path this equation determines the optimal value of the abatement effort a per unit of output x 1 . If l 1 = 0, condition (10c) reduces to the truism 0 = 0. If, however, the established technique is not used at all, the optimal abatement effort a = 0, as no emissions have to be abated.
As noted above, the optimal system dynamics of the optimization problem (8) splits into three cases, an interior solution and two corner solutions. In Appendix A.1 we show that each case exhibits a (different) stationary state. In particular, the stationary state of the interior solution represents a saddle point, i.e. there exists a unique optimal path which converges towards the stationary state (see Appendix A.2).
We first restrict our attention to the case of an interior solution, i.e. q i (t) = q l 1 (t) = 0. Together with transversality condition (10h), and inserting conditions (10a) and (10b), condition (10e) can be unambiguously solved:
Thus, along the optimal path the shadow price for the capital stock equals the net present value of all future welfare gains of one additional marginal unit of the capital good. As capital goods are long-lived, they contribute over the whole time horizon (increasingly less though due to deterioration). The fraction under the integral equals the marginal instantaneous welfare gain of an additional unit of capital, which comprises two components. The first is the direct welfare gain due to the energy produced. It is positive if the new technology needs less labor input per unit of output than the established one, i.e. λ < 1 + a. The second term is always positive and denotes the welfare gain due to emissions abated by switching from the established to the new production technique. In the interior solution the shadow price of capital is always positive (otherwise it is optimal not to invest, i.e. i = 0, which contradicts the assumption of an interior solution). Inserting conditions (10a) and (10b) in equation (10d) yields:
The equation states that along the optimal path the present value of the welfare loss by investing in one marginal unit of new capital, which is given by the present value welfare gain of the alternative use of one marginal unit of labor in the established production technique minus the resulting disutility from emissions (left-hand side), equals the net present value of the sum of all future welfare gains by using the new capital good in production (right-hand side). As the investment needs the time span σ to become productive capital, the sum of all future welfare gains of an investment at time t is given by the shadow price of capital at time t + σ, q k (t + σ).
Conditions for investment and replacement
Thus far it is not clear to which of the three possible stationary states the system will tend. We now derive conditions for the exogenous parameters identifying which of the three possible cases for the system dynamics applies. These conditions determine whether there is any investment in the new technology, and if so, whether the established technology is eventually fully replaced by the new one. We start with the investment condition.
In order to derive a condition which identifies whether investment is optimal, we assume the economy to stay in the no investment corner solution. We derive a condition for which the corner solution violates the necessary and sufficient condition for an optimal solution. The following proposition states the result.
Proposition 1 (Investment condition in the social optimum)
Given optimization problem (8), the new technology is innovated, i.e. i(t) > 0, iff
where a 0 is determined by the unique solution of the implicit equation:
The proof is given in Appendix A.3. Condition (14) for the investment in the new technology has an intuitive economic interpretation. The left-hand side corresponds to the unit costs of production of the established technology, U C 0 T 1 , the right-hand side to the unit costs of production of the new technology, U C 0 T 2 . Thus, condition (14) states that for the new technology to be innovated its unit costs of production have to be below those of the established technology, i.e. U C
In the centralized economy, U C 0 T 1 comprises three components, the 'pure' labor costs per unit of energy production, the labor costs for abatement per unit, and the social costs of unit emissions in terms of labor. U C 0 T 2 comprises, apart from the 'pure' labor costs, the costs for building up and maintaining the necessary capital good in terms of labor. Obviously, the capital costs per unit of output depend positively on the dynamic characteristics γ and σ of the capital good production, as well as on the time preference rate ρ. In particular, the longer the time lag σ and the higher the rate of time preference ρ the higher are the unit costs of production of the new technology.
Despite the infinite time horizon and the linearity of the two production techniques, condition (14) does not guarantee full replacement of the established technology by the new technology in the long run. In the following, we deduce conditions for which complete or partial replacement occur. Formally, full replacement of the established by the new production technique is given by the corner solution l 1 (t) = 0. The inference of a condition for full replacement is similar to that of proposition 1. We investigate under which conditions a full replacement stationary state, in which all labor is used to employ and maintain the fully developed new technology, is consistent with the necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimal solution as given by equations (10a)-(10h). Proposition 2 states the result.
Proposition 2 (Full replacement condition in the social optimum)
Given optimization problem (8) and assuming U (x ∞ ) − D (0) = 0, full replacement of the established technology by the new one in the long-run stationary state is consistent with the necessary and sufficient conditions for a social optimum, iff
where x ∞ is given by
The proof is given in Appendix A.4.
Proposition 2 says that full replacement can only occur if the costs per unit of output of the new technology in the full replacement stationary state U C ∞ T 2 (right-hand side) are smaller than or equal to the costs of the established technology U C ∞ T 1 (left-hand side). As there are no emissions in the full replacement stationary state, abatement effort is zero and U C ∞ T 1 only consists of the 'pure' labor costs plus the social costs, which stem from the damage of the first marginal unit of emissions. In the common case that the first marginal unit of emissions does not induce any environmental damage, i.e.
reduces to the 'pure' labor costs of production.
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For full replacement condition (14) and condition (16) must hold simultaneously. A straightforward corollary from propositions 1 and 2 is that the established technology is only partially replaced by the new one, if condition (14) holds but (16) is violated.
Corollary 1 (Partial replacement condition in the social optimum)
Given optimization problem (8) and U (x ∞ ) − D (0) = 0, partial replacement of the established technology by the new one is optimal in the long-run stationary state, i.e. the long-run stationary state is an interior solution, iff
where x ∞ = 1 λ+γ and a 0 is given by the unique solution of the implicit equation (15).
In sum, investment is never optimal if the labor costs per unit of output of the new technology,
, are higher than the labor costs per unit of output of the established technology in the no investment corner solution,
, the new technology will partly replace the established technology in the optimal long-run stationary state.
Competitive market equilibrium
We now consider a decentralized economy, in which a representative household and two representative firms interact on competitive markets for labor, capital and energy, which are cleared at all times. Due to the emission externality and the split time-preference rates, the long-run stationary state in the decentralized economy falls, in general, short of the social optimum. We show how social optimal path can be implemented by complementing a standard emission tax with an investment subsidy.
Representative household
We assume the household to own the two firms and the total labor and capital endowments of the economy. Thus, the household chooses between selling labor to the firms at the market price of labor w and investing labor in the accumulation of capital k, which the household rents to the firms at the market price of capital r. In addition, the household buys energy x and may profit from the investment subsidy τ i (t), paid per unit of investment i. Choosing energy as numeraire, the following budget constraint has to hold at all times t:
where π 1 and π 2 denote the profits of firm 1 and 2. In addition, capital can be accumulated according to equation (5). Assuming that the representative household maximizes its intertemporal welfare as given by equation (6), i.e. it applies a higher rate of time preference ρ p in the decentralized market regime than in the social decision context, the household solves the following maximization problem:
Thus, the present value Hamiltonian H H reads:
where q k denotes the costate variable or shadow price of the capital stock k, and q b and q i denote the Kuhn-Tucker parameters for the (in)equality conditions (19b)and (19d) . Again, the strict concavity of the Hamiltonian H H (at least along the optimal path) ensures a unique solution. Assuming that the Hamiltonian H H is continuously differentiable with respect to the control variable i, the following necessary conditions hold for an optimal solution:
7 Following the standard notation, τ > 0 denotes a tax and τ < 0 corresponds to a subsidy.
Due to the strict concavity of the Hamiltonian, the necessary conditions (21a)-(21c) are also sufficient if, in addition, a transversality condition analogous to condition (10h) holds. Together with this transversality condition, condition (21b) can be unambiguously solved to yield:
Firms
Taking prices as given, the firms maximize their profits in the competitive market equilibrium. Firm 1 produces energy according to the first production technology, described by equations (1) and (8c). Given a tax τ e per unit of emissions, its profit π 1 at time t is given by:
Firm 1 chooses both labor l 1 and abatement effort a such as to maximize the net present value of all future profits, which is equivalent to maximizing the profit π 1 at all times t. A necessary condition for profit maximization is
which is an implicit equation for the unique optimal abatement effort a (t), as long as l 1 (t) > 0 and τ e (t) > 0. If l 1 (t) = 0 or τ e (t) = 0, the optimal abatement effort a (t) = 0, as either no emissions have to be abated or emission abatement is a pure cost to the firm. Profit function π 1 (t) is linear in labor demand l 1 (t). Thus, the demand for l 1 (t) is given by the following correspondence:
where the optimal abatement effort a is given by the solution of the implicit equation τ e (t)G (a(t)) = w(t) if l 1 (t) > 0, and a(t) = 0 if l 1 (t) = 0 or τ e (t) = 0. Firm 2 produces energy according to the second production technology, described by equation (3). Neither the innovation subsidy τ i nor the emission tax τ e directly affects firm 2. Thus, the profit π 2 at time t equals:
which is a linear function of k. As a consequence, the profit π 2 is non-negative for any k > 0, as long as the value of outputs exceeds the value of inputs. Analogously to firm 1, firm 2 demands as much capital as possible together with λk units of labor, if the value of the output exceeds the value of the inputs. Thus, the demand of firm 2 is given by the following correspondence:
4.3 Necessary and sufficient condition for the market equilibrium
At the market equilibrium, all markets clear. Again, the market solution may exhibit two corner solutions, in which either the household never invests in capital, or the total labor endowment is used to employ and maintain the capital stock. In the former, firm 2 is unable to operate. In the latter, firm 1 is driven out of the market. First, we analyze the interior market equilibrium where both firms operate (i.e. l 1 (t), i(t) > 0). From conditions (24), (25) and (27) we derive the following equations:
Inserting equation (29) into equation (21a) yields
which together with equation (28) determines the interior market equilibrium for a given emission tax τ e and investment subsidy τ i . From equation (21a) we see that the future welfare gains of a marginal unit of capital (right-hand side) have to equal its current welfare losses due to the costs of labor minus the investment subsidy (left-hand side). Intuitively, the welfare costs of a marginal unit of capital are lower, the higher is the environmental tax τ e and the higher (i.e. the more negative) is the investment subsidy τ i . Comparing the equation (31) with the corresponding condition (14) at the social optimum, we see that, in general, the decentralized market equilibrium falls short of the social optimum, as the welfare costs of investment in the former exceed the corresponding costs in the latter. As a consequence, in the decentralized market solution without policy intervention less favorable circumstances for investment in the new production technique prevail than in the social optimum. To derive the optimal levels for the emission tax and the investment subsidy, we first compare (28) with the corresponding condition (11) at the social optimum. We derive for the optimal emission tax τ opt e :
Second, inserting equation (22) into equation (31) and equation (12) into equation (13) and comparing the resulting conditions, we derive for the optimal investment subsidy τ opt i :
Note that if the two instruments are set in such a way that the market equilibrium is identical to the social optimum, τ opt e is always positive (i.e. emissions are taxed) and τ opt i is always negative (i.e. investment is subsidized).
Conditions for investment and replacement
In the following, we derive conditions for investment and full replacement in the decentralized economy. Again, we first assume the economy to stay in the no investment corner solution. Given the stationary state with no investment in capital at all times, we derive a condition for positive investment to be a market equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Investment condition in the competitive market equilibrium)
Given the household's problem (19), the profit functions (23) and (26) of firm 1 and firm 2, and the emission tax τ e (t) and the investment subsidy τ i (t), the new technology is innovated in the market equilibrium, i.e. i(t) > 0, iff the following condition holds:
where τ 0 e = τ e (t), τ 0 i = τ i (t) evaluated at the no investment stationary state and, if τ 0 e > 0, a 0 is determined by the unique solution of the implicit equation:
Condition (34b) for the market equilibrium is identical to the corresponding condition for the social optimum (14), if τ 0 e and τ 0 i are set as follows:
where
The proof is given in Appendix A.5. Conditions (34b) and (34a) display the unit costs of energy production of the established and the new technology in the competitive market equilibrium. Again, the new technology has to display lower unit costs of production than the established technology in order to be innovated. In the unregulated market regime, the social costs of pollution are not accounted for and thus firm 1 has no incentive to abate. UC T 1 reduces to the 'pure' costs of production, and is thus lower than socially optimal. UC T 2 displays the same composition as at the social optimum. However, as it now depends on ρ p > ρ, it exceeds the socially optimal unit costs of energy of the new technology. Thus, in the unregulated market economy higher UC T 2 have to stay below lower UC T 1 as compared to the social optimum for the new technology to be innovated. The new technology is disadvantaged in a twofold manner.
Imposing τ e enforces the incorporation of the social costs of emissions into the unit costs of production of the established technology. Setting τ 0 e equal to the ratio between marginal damage from environmental degradation and marginal benefit from consumption raises UC T 1 to its socially optimal level. However, as obvious from condition (34b), the imposition of the emission tax is not sufficient for the market equilibrium to resemble the social optimum. Lowering UC T 2 to its socially optimal level can be achieved by payment of an investment subsidy.
We now derive the conditions for which full replacement of the established by the new technology is a market equilibrium in the long run.
Proposition 4 (Full replacement in the competitive market equilibrium)
Given the household's problem (19), the profit functions (23) and (26) of firm 1 and firm 2, the emission tax τ e (t) and the investment subsidy τ i (t), full replacement of the established technology by the new one in the long-run stationary state is consistent with the necessary and sufficient conditions for a regulated market equilibrium, iff the following condition holds:
where τ ∞ e = τ e (t), τ ∞ i = τ i (t) evaluated at the long-run stationary state. Condition (37b) for the market equilibrium is identical to the corresponding condition for the social optimum (16), if τ ∞ e and τ ∞ i are set as follows:
The proof is given in Appendix A.6
The economic interpretation of conditions (37a) and (37b) is analogous to that of conditions (34a) and (34b). Although the external effect from the emissions vanishes in case the new technology fully replaces the old one, a positive emission tax has to be raised if D (0) > 0 for the market equilibrium to resemble the social optimum. For D (0) = 0, the optimal tax in the full replacement stationary state is given by τ ∞ e = 0. The optimal investment subsidy τ ∞ i has to be negative in any case. For full replacement to occur in the regulated market regime in the long run, conditions (34b) and (37b) have to hold simultaneously. However, if τ e and τ i are such that condition (34b) is always fulfilled but condition (37b) is always violated, the economy exhibits a market equilibrium where both technologies are used. That is, partial replacement of the established by the new technique is optimal. Note that partial replacement of the established technology by the new one cannot occur in the unregulated market regime.
Discussion
Before discussing model assumptions and policy implications, we briefly summarize the findings of our analysis. Recall that there are two energy technologies available in the economy. The first gives rise to emissions which can be partly abated by an end-of-pipe technology. The resulting net emissions impose a negative externality on society. The second is clean but needs some time σ before investment becomes productive. Moreover, the intertemporal valuation is deterred by the split between the private and social rates of time preference. Whether the second technology (partly) replaces the first one hinges on the exogenously given parameters and on whether and to what extent the emission externality and the split of time preferences are corrected by an emission tax τ e and an investment subsidy τ i . Figure 1 illustrates the findings.
In the unregulated market regime U C T 1 always equals 1. Thus, the combination of the unit costs of production of the two technologies associated with the investment and replacement conditions is always represented by a point on the U C T 2 axis in Figure 1 . For example, point A un denotes a situation where no investment in the new technology takes place in the unregulated market regime, though full replacement would be socially optimal (point A so ). Imposing an emission tax τ e increases U C T 1 (upwards shift in Figure 1) . At the social optimum U C T 1 equals 1
. The introduction of an investment subsidy decreases U C T 2 , shifting it to the left in Figure 1 . In general, the social optimum in a market regime can only be implemented by combining environmental and technology policies (moving from A un to A so ). In the example, the sole imposition of the emission tax would lead to a partial replacement of the established technology (shift from A un to A tax ), and the sole imposition of the investment subsidy leaves the economy in the no-investment stationary state (shift from A un to A sub ). 
Model assumptions
In our analysis, we explore the welfare-theoretic implications of diverging social and private time preferences for the time-lagged transition from a polluting established to a new clean technology. Although our model considers important features of the energy industry, we make a series of simplifying assumptions, which we shall briefly discuss in the following.
In our model we consider a flow pollutant, whereas the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere causing the rise of global mean temperature is a stock-pollutant problem. This simplification does not qualitatively affect our results. However, for a stock pollutant, the split of time-preference rates would imply an underestimation of the future damages from emissions today by the individual households compared to the social planner. As a consequence, the unit costs of production of the established technology would be further underestimated in the not optimally regulated market economy.
By modeling the technologies as linear and linear-limitational, we assume very specific functional forms. The rationale is to account for the rigidities in energy conversion due to technical and thermodynamic constraints. From a more technical point of view, it is the linearity of the production functions which gives rise to the corner solutions we exploit to derive the conditions of investment and partial and full replacement. As our focus is on the substitution effects between (the established and the new) production technologies, the analysis abstracts from substitution possibilities among different production factors within the individual technologies. Taking a medium-term perspective with invariable technologies, we abstract furthermore from some typical long-run problems. First, we neglect endogenous technological change in the sense that new technologies emerge or technologies become more efficient over time. Second, we do not consider fuel inputs explicitly and thus implicitly assume the finiteness of conventional energy sources to be non-binding over the relevant time horizon. Finally, we abstract from growth. Obviously, all these characteristics are important for successful climate-change mitigation strategies but are not in the primary focus of our paper.
Finally, for the sake of a tractable model we abstract from a series of peculiarities relevant in the economics of electric power systems. First, the energy industry is subject to cyclical demand fluctuations on different time-scales (for example day/night-time or summer/winter). As different energy technologies exhibit different turn-on/turn-off costs and rigidities, a mix of energy technologies is in general preferable over 'energy monocultures'. Second, in contrast to our assumption of a perfectly competitive market, the energy industry rather exhibits an oligopolistic market structure. As is well known from the industrial organization literature, unregulated oligopolistic market regimes lead in general to additional market failures, from which we abstract to concentrate on the distortions imposed by emissions and diverging time-preference rates.
Policy implications
Although the analysis has been carried out in a highly stylized theoretical framework, direct policy implications can be drawn which are relevant for the regulation of the energy industry in particular, and optimal technological transitions in general.
First, our analysis shows that the time lag in the production of capital amplifies the distortion created by the split of time preference rates. As the energy sector exhibits substantial construction lags, we expect it to be particularly affected. An analysis by Heinzel (2008) for the case of the German power industry around 2015 shows that the distortion induced on the (imputed) unit costs of electricity at the busbar of new coal, gas or nuclear power plants may amount to 1.0-18.5 ¤/MWh. He shows that its elimination may have a decisive impact on the technology ranking.
Second, our analysis gives new theoretical support for policies that subsidize clean energy technologies. According to our analysis the level of the subsidy should, in particular, depend on the difference in time-preference rates and the time lag in construction of the new technology. Thus, we are rather skeptical about the efficiency of policies such as the German "Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz" (Renewable Energy Sources Act) that subsidizes only renewable energy technologies by feed-in tariffs oriented at the level of their unit costs of production.
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Finally, the analysis implies that for the transition towards a low-emission energy industry the imposition of an environmental tax alone is in general not sufficient to implement the socially optimal path.
9 Rather, technology policy should complement environmental policy. As a general result, this is not new, as there is a series of well established causes for technology policy associated with the process of technological transformation (e.g. Jaffe et al. 2005) . We derive this result without considering these cases. In our model, it is the split of social and private time-preference rates combined with the time-consuming nature of bringing a new technology into use which leads to the additional distortion. The split time-preference rates thus constitute a general case for a welfare-enhancing policy intervention, irrespective of the causes of the split. However, the intervention is to be directed towards the source of the distortion. The split of the rates itself may only be the direct point of reference, if and only if the underlying market failure cannot directly or differently be remedied. We briefly introduced two such causes in the introduction.
Conclusion
We study the implications of diverging social and private time-preference rates for the transition from an established polluting to a new clean energy technology in a timelagged general equilibrium model. The two distortions in the model create in a mutually reinforcing way less favorable circumstances for the introduction of the new technology, and hence delay or even hinder structural change as compared to the social optimum. The distortion created by the split of time-preference rates and amplified by time-tobuild feature of capital constitutes a general case for a welfare-enhancing policy intervention, irrespective of the causes of the split. The split of the rates itself may, however, only be the direct point of reference, if and only if the underlying market failure cannot directly or differently be remedied. We show for this case that the socially optimal path may be implemented if, in addition to standard environmental policy, an investment subsidy is paid. Our results constructively contribute to the Kyoto conflict between the United States and the European Union. Instead of asking which of the two policies to apply, our findings indicate that the correct question is how to optimally combine both policies.
In different respects, our analysis sticks to simplest cases. In particular, we avoid an endogenous explanation of the split of the rates in the model and consider a flow pollutant. While this is sufficient to clarify the basic relationships, it points to a number of issues for further research. Thus far, there has been no systematic analysis of the causes of the split of social and private time preferences, their quantitative contribution to the split, and the specific policy implications with respect to each cause. Further theoretical investigations should especially account for a richer representation of preferences.
optimal paths converge towards the stationary state given by
A.2 Saddle point stability of the interior solution
In order to show the saddle point property of the stationary state in the case of an interior solution, i.e. i(t) > 0 and l 1 (t) > 0 ∀ t, we investigate the following general maximization problem:
which is equivalent to the optimization problem (8) in the case of an interior solution with
The corresponding present-value Hamiltonian reads
where q denotes the shadow price for the state variable k.
Given that the Hamiltonian (A.7) is strictly concave, the following conditions are necessary and sufficient for an optimal solution: 12
Differentiating equations (A.8a) and (A.8b) with respect to time t, inserting (A.8a), (A.8c) and (A.5b) into the resulting equations, and solving for
dt and dk(t) dt yields the following set of functional differential equations:
In the stationary state,
= 0 holds. Thus, the unique stationary state (i , a , k ) is determined by the three implicit equations:
Inserting F i , F a and F k yields the equations (A.1).
In order to investigate the stability properties of optimization problem (A.5) in a neighborhood around the stationary state (i , a , k ), we linearize the system of functional differential equations (A.9) around the stationary state. Therefore, we introduce the new variableŝ
Applying the first-order Taylor approximation of the system (A.9) around the stationary state (i , a , k ) yields:
where all functions are evaluated at the stationary state (i , a , k ). Similar to the case of ordinary linear first-order differential equations, the solutions forî,â andk can be written sums of exponential functionŝ A.15) where the i n , a n and k n are constants, which can (at least in principle) be unambiguously determined by the set of initial conditions and the transversality condition, and the z n are the roots of the characteristic polynomial Q(z). The characteristic polynomial Q(z) for the system of differential-difference equations (A.14) is given by
is a quasi-polynomial, which, in general, exhibits an infinite number of complex roots.
In order to determine whether the stationary state is a saddle point, we need to know the signs of the real parts of the characteristic roots. Therefore, we show that the characteristic polynomial Q(z) has an infinite number of roots with negative real part and an infinite number of roots with positive real part and, thus, the stationary state is a saddle point. First, note that the characteristic roots of Q(z) are symmetric around ρ/2, i.e., if z 0 is a characteristic root, then ρ − z 0 is also a characteristic root (one can easily verify that Q(z 0 ) = Q(ρ − z 0 )).
Second, in order to apply Theorem 13.1 of Bellman and Cooke (1963: 441) , we introduce the new variable y = σz and multiply Q with σ 2 exp[y]
As Q(y) has no principal term, i.e. a term, where the highest power of y and the highest exponential term appear jointly, 13 Q(y) has "an unbounded number of zeros with arbitrarily large positive real part" (ibid). However, as the characteristic roots are symmetric around ρ/2, this implies that Q(y) has also an unbounded number of roots with arbitrarily large negative real part.
13 In this case, the principal term would be a term with y 2 exp[2y].
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Assume that it is optimal not to invest at all times t. As a consequence, the economy will remain in the no investment corner solution where no capital is accumulated. Hence, i(t) = 0 and q i (t) ≥ 0 ∀ t. All energy is solely produced by the established production technique which implies that x 0 = x 0 1 = l 0 1 = 1 − a 0 , x 0 2 = 0, > 0 and q l 1 = 0. The optimal abatement effort a 0 is determined by equation (11) by inserting x 0 = 1 − a 0 and e 0 = x 0 (1 − G(a 0 )) which yields equation (15). Due to the assumed curvature properties of U , D and G, there exists a unique solution for a 0 .
In the corner solution i(t) = 0, we derive the shadow price of capital q 0 k (t) by solving the differential equation (10e):
Equating conditions (10c) and (10d), and inserting equations (10b) and q 0 k (t + σ) yields the following necessary and sufficient condition for the corner solution to be optimal:
Taking into account that q i (t) ≥ 0, dividing by D (e 0 )G (a 0 ) and rearranging terms yields:
Note that condition (A.20) is independent of t. This implies that it is optimal not to invest at all times t, if it is optimal not to invest at time t = 0. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Assume that it is optimal in the long-run stationary state to use the total labor endowment to employ and maintain the capital stock for the new technology, i.e. x ∞ 2 = 1 λ+γ . Then, all output is solely produced by the new technology, i.e. x ∞ = x ∞ 2 , x ∞ 1 = l ∞ 1 = 0. In addition, no emissions are produced and have to be abated, and thus e ∞ = 0 and a ∞ = 0. Inserting conditions (10a) and (10b) into equation (10e) 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Assume that it is optimal not to invest at all times t. As a consequence, the economy will remain in the no investment corner solution where no capital is accumulated. Hence, i(t) = 0 and q i (t) ≥ 0 ∀ t. All energy is solely produced by the established production technique (i.e.
x 0 = x 0 1 = l 0 1 = 1 − a 0 , x 0 2 = 0). We know from conditions (25) and (27): Inserting equation (A.23a) and q 0 k into equation (21a), and taking into account that q i (t) ≥ 0, we derive: .25) 14 Note that q l1 (t) is constant in current values in the stationary state and, thus, q l1 (t) = q , condition (A.27) which determines the profit maximizing abatement effort a 0 becomes identical to equation (15) which determines the socially optimal abatement level. Furthermore, inserting τ 0 e and τ 0 i from equations (36a) and (36b) into condition (34b) yields (after some tedious calculations) the investment condition in the social optimum (14).
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Assume that using the total labor endowment to employ and maintain the capital stock for the new technology in the long-run stationary state is a market equilibrium, i.e. l ∞ 1 = 0, i ∞ > 0 and q ∞ i = 0. Then, all output is solely produced by the new technology, i.e. x ∞ = x ∞ 2 = 1 λ+γ and x ∞ 1 = l ∞ 1 = 0. In addition, no emissions are produced and have to be abated and, thus, e ∞ = 0 and a ∞ = 0. For this case, we know from demand correspondences (25) and (27) of firm 1 and firm 2: w(t) ≤ 1 − τ e (t) , (A.28a) r(t) = 1 − λw(t) .
(A.28b)
Inserting equation (A.28b) into equation (22), yields for the the shadow price of capital: .29) where w ∞ = w(t) evaluated at the full replacement stationary state and thus is a constant.
Inserting q ∞ k and inequality (A.28a) into equation (21a), and taking into account that q i (t) = 0, we derive the following condition:
(A.30)
Dividing by (1 − τ ∞ e ) and rearranging terms yields condition (37b). Setting τ ∞ e = τ ∞ i = 0, we derive condition (37a).
Furthermore, inserting τ ∞ e and τ ∞ i from equations (38) and (39) into condition (37b) yields (after some tedious calculations) the full replacement condition in the social optimum (16).
